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Problem area 
With the introduction of advanced 
planning concepts in the CDM 
framework, the possibility to “cheat 
the system” will start being 
exploited. Instead of a co-operative 
attitude of participants, as often 
assumed in research on distributed 
planning, participants will show 
competitive behaviour. This may 
lead to suboptimal performance, as 
participants care more about their 
own preferences than those of 
others. Thus, incentives for 
co-operative behaviour are needed.  
 
Description of work 
In this paper, we sketch a future 
scenario in which arrival, gate, and 
departure planning is handled 
distributed by airlines, airports, 
aircraft, and other parties involved. 
We present a collaboration 
framework that does not allow 
exploitation of strategically 
advantageous positions. All airlines 
can participate and are rewarded for 
a positive attitude. We propose the 
use of money as a means of 
providing incentives to collaborate, 
to ensure equitability, and to find 
optimal solutions. We introduce a 
monetary system based on spender-
signed money that solves the 
problem of selfish behaviour. 
Airlines that manipulate the 
planning process to obtain an unfair 
advantage over others are 
automatically punished as a result 
of the spender-signed monetary 
system. 
 
Results and conclusions 
We have performed experiments in 
which it shows that selfish 
behaviour can be detected and even 
countered with the building of 
coalitions against cheating actors. 
Simulations prove that cheating will 
give an initial benefit for one or two 
times, but afterwards will work in 
ones disadvantage.  
 
Applicability 
In any application area where 
collaboration is required between 
parties that serve their own interest 
the proposed method can be applied 
to achieve efficient and equitable 
co-operation. If, for instance, Free 
Flight would in the future be 
extended to include communication 
of intent or preference information, 
exploitation should surely be 
prevented. As another application 
example, the business trajectory as 
now proposed in SESAR lends 
itself very well for the described 
approach. 
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Summary 
In this paper, we sketch a future scenario in which arrival, gate and departure planning is done 
distributedly by airlines, airports, aircraft and other parties involved. Decision responsibility is 
shared among multiple parties instead of one. When disruptions occur, plan repair schemes are 
collaboratively constructed and selected. This results in a plan repair mechanism that takes into 
account the preferences of all participants. Often in distributed planning research, a cooperative 
attitude of the participants is assumed. However, it is possible that participants will show a 
competitive rather than a cooperative attitude. Competitive behaviour can lead to suboptimal 
performance, as participants care more about their own preferences than those of others. Thus, 
incentives for cooperative behaviour are needed. We propose the use of money as a means of 
providing incentives to collaborate, to ensure equitability and to find optimal solutions. We 
identify a problem that occurs with the use of ordinary money. We introduce a monetary system 
based on spender-signed money that solves the problem of selfish behaviour. 
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Abstract: In this paper, we sketch a future scenario in which arrival, gate and departure planning is done 
distributedly by airlines, airports, aircraft and other parties involved. Decision responsibility is shared 
among multiple parties instead of one. When disruptions occur, plan repair schemes are collaboratively 
constructed and selected. This results in a plan repair mechanism that takes into account the preferences 
of all participants. Often in distributed planning research, a cooperative attitude of the participants is 
assumed. However, it is possible that participants will show a competitive rather than a cooperative 
attitude. Competitive behaviour can lead to suboptimal performance, as participants care more about their 
own preferences than those of others. Thus, incentives for cooperative behaviour are needed. We propose 
the use of money as a means of providing incentives to collaborate, to ensure equitability and to find 
optimal solutions. We identify a problem that occurs with the use of ordinary money. We introduce a 
monetary system based on spender-signed money that solves the problem of selfish behaviour. 
 
1 Introduction 
During a standard day of operation at 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, several aircraft arrive 
and depart later than scheduled, causing disruptions 
in the gate allocation process. The gate manager is 
constantly replanning gates in order to optimize the 
tactical operations, based on the latest information on 
arrival and departure traffic. ATC and airlines will be 
informed about the new plan, but do not have an 
active involvement in the process. 
Involving ATC and airlines in this planning 
process will increase efficiency of the total airport 
operations. Hub airlines are faced with delays but are 
the one party to have good insight in the 
circumstances concerning the transfer of passengers. 
ATC can be involved through the arrival and 
departure management process. 
In current innovative ATM and airport 
programs and research, there is a trend to distribute 
decision making processes. This ranges from 
information sharing to distributed planning and 
scheduling, mostly in the context of the U.S. and 
European Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) 
programs. In the Total Airport Management (TAM) 
concept [12] current airport optimisation systems 
evolve from the situation where they act as individual 
support tools to become components of an integrated 
airport information architecture that constitutes a 
holistic decision-support processes for all airport 
partners.  
 
Examples of the trend to distribute decision 
processes include the Free Flight paradigm [9], in 
which aircraft jointly decide on flight paths and 
conflict resolution, arrival self spacing and merging 
[4], inbound priority sequencing [8], pre-departure 
sequencing [14] and the recent Ground Delay 
Program Enhancements, in which airlines have 
(limited) collaborative planning opportunities.  
In general, participants become more actively 
involved in the decision process than is the case now, 
either by taking into account submitted information 
or preferences or by handing over responsibility to 
them. The shift is from local decision making by 
independent planners to a distributed environment, 
where participants act as each others’ equals and 
decisions are taken by subgroups of participants. The 
benefits are clear: increased information sharing and 
distributed decision making leads to increased overall 
quality of the plans. 
These new trends also introduce a fundamental 
problem. The programs mentioned above all assume 
a cooperative attitude of the participants. However, it 
is not unthinkable that participants will show a 
competitive attitude rather than a cooperative. This is 
the case in current practice already. Often, it can be 
commercially attractive for an airline to provide delay 
information or to cancel a slot as late as possible, to 
avoid slots from being used by another airline.  
If participants have a competitive attitude, a 
distributed planning system that relies on information 
sharing and shared responsibility will perform poorly. 
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As each individual participant will try to maximize its 
own utility, it might withhold or manipulate 
information. Also, in joint decisions it will do its best 
to reach those decisions which are best for itself and 
ignore the interests of others. 
We argue that one should not assume a 
cooperative attitude among the participants, but 
provide explicit incentives for cooperative behaviour. 
The need for incentives has in fact been mentioned in 
several CDM and Free Flight studies. 
A natural incentive is the monetary incentive. 
One could financially reward cooperative behaviour 
or make selfish behaviour costly. This is applying the 
market paradigm to joint decision making. The 
results have, as we will see, the characteristics of an 
efficient and equitable decision mechanism. We will 
show how it also introduces new challenges. As a 
solution we will introduce a private monetary system 
which protects users against exploitation of strategic 
advantages, leading to equitable plan repair. 
We will exemplify this in a distributed tactical 
airport planning scenario. In this scenario airlines 
jointly decide on how to resolve gate planning 
conflicts. Airlines can cooperate in solving each 
others conflicts, but can also refuse to help others.  
2 Background 
In the U.S. and European CDM programs, 
airlines, pilots and air traffic controllers are asked to 
make operational information known to others as 
early as possible, thereby making it possible to plan 
and replan at an early stage and increase overall 
planning quality [14,  6]. Current trends include the 
modelling of preference-based planning techniques 
that use individual preference functions of airlines, 
pilots, ground handlers, airports, etc., to determine 
optimal arrival and departure times [10, 12]. In the 
CDM programs, a cooperative attitude among the 
participants is assumed and the provided information 
is assumed to be true. However, it might very well be 
beneficial to an individual participant to provide not-
so-true information or preferences. It is well known 
that airlines have a tendency of withholding delay 
information to avoid negative replanning 
consequences. Although in one experiment on CDM 
[2] it was observed that participants were 
cooperative, in [3] it was argued that participants 
might start to become competitive once they have 
familiarized themselves with the new procedures. 
Market mechanisms play an increasingly 
important role in ATM. In the U.S., airlines may 
trade assigned slots among each other. In Europe, 
slots may be exchanged among airlines [15]. The use 
of auctions for initial slot assignment is investigated 
by both the U.S. and Europe air traffic authorities 
[21, 15, 5] as well as in several research papers [16, 
11]. Other examples of market-based techniques are 
congestion pricing [7] and peak pricing [13], which 
are techniques that aim to reduce traffic at busy time 
periods by means of higher prices. 
Slot exchange as described above concerns 
long- and mid-term planning. Slot exchange during 
the day of operations is to a certain extent made 
possible in the recent extensions of the ground delay 
programs (GDP’s), as part of the U.S. CDM 
program. GDP’s are protocols that specify how 
arrival slots should be redistributed among airlines 
when an airport has reached its arrival capacity. The 
latest extension, Slot Credit Substitution, allows an 
airline to propose some limited form of rescheduling. 
It was observed in [1] that this mechanism is only a 
small step away from a resource market in which 
airlines trade slots among each other. 
2.1 Tactical plan repair 
The application domain of this paper is plan 
repair in arrival, departure and gate planning, which 
we will call tactical plan repair. By plan repair we 
mean alterations to planning and schedules that are 
made after the plans have been constructed. 
Disruptions such as flight delays, cancellations, re-
routings, technical failures and weather 
circumstances can cause plannings to become 
infeasible. A repair scheme solves such planning 
conflicts by reallocating resources among their users. 
For instance, if an arriving aircraft is delayed by half 
an hour, it may cause a conflict on its assigned gate 
with the aircraft that was assigned on that gate after 
it. A possible repair scheme could be that the other 
aircraft waits until the first aircraft leaves or that it is 
assigned to another gate. 
Generally speaking, the goal of plan repair is to 
solve planning conflicts in such a way that the impact 
on the overall planning is minimal. There are three 
criteria ATM planning, and also plan repair, should 
meet: punctuality, efficiency and equity. By 
punctuality we mean minimization of the difference 
between the time an event was planned and the time 
that it executes. High punctuality means high 
satisfaction of involved parties. But more important, a 
high punctuality is an indication of possible excess 
capacity. If an airport structurally experiences heavy 
delays, one would not want to schedule more flights. 
If an airport experiences no delays, there could be 
room for the scheduling of more flights. Thus, 
capacity is an underlying goal for the punctuality 
criterion. 
By efficiency we mean the sum of utilities of 
all involved parties, such as airlines, airport, 
passengers, ground handlers, governments, etc. 
Trivially, a higher delay has a lower utility to an 
airline and its passengers. A gate change has a higher 
utility for ground handlers if the new gate is not too 
far from where their equipment is. Governments 
utilities have to do with noise and emission, which 
influences planning and repair. 
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By equity we mean that equal parties should be 
treated equally. The most important instance is equity 
between airlines. If an airline feels that it is treated 
unfairly, be it by discriminating regulations or by 
receiving an unfairly large share of the plan repair 
burden, it will protest to the air traffic authorities or 
even file a lawsuit. The latter, for instance, was the 
case against the British Airports Authority when they 
introduced peak pricing rules with the aim of 
increasing runway throughput [18]. In the case of 
plan repair, equity means that participants responsible 
for planning conflicts should bear the burden of 
solving it, and, when no one is responsible, the 
burden should be spread out evenly.  
Tactical plan repair is currently done manually 
in an ad-hoc fashion with a limited number of rules of 
thumb, leading to inefficient repairs. If an aircraft 
causes a gate conflict, the gate manager manually 
solves this conflict by scheduling the aircraft at a later 
moment or at another gate. The major rules concern 
security, regulations, passenger’s level of service, 
practical solution, and to limit the number of other 
aircraft/gates involved. Priority rules exist at 
Schiphol, where airlines from example the Sky Team 
Alliance (in which Air France/KLM is a member) 
prefer to be parked close together. Another example 
is departure plan repair. When an aircraft fails to 
depart within its time slot, it looses the slot and has to 
wait until a new slot becomes available. Inter-airline 
slot exchange mechanisms do not exist, with the 
exception of the recent GDP extensions. 
There are three reasons why tactical plan repair 
performance is currently suboptimal. First, the fact 
that plan repair is done by human operators limits the 
complexity of plan repair schemes considered.  
Secondly, the equity rule that the causer of a conflict 
should be the only one affected by the repair limits 
the number of allowed plan repair schemes. Thirdly, 
lack of information about status and preferences of 
the participants involved prevents precise weighing 
and comparing of different repair schemes. In the 
next section we will see how the paradigm of 
distributed tactical plan repair alleviates these 
limitations. 
3 Distributed tactical plan 
repair 
We envision a scenario in which the paradigms 
of distribution of control and market mechanisms are 
applied to the tactical plan repair domain, leading to 
distributed tactical plan repair. In this scenario, 
participants initiate plan repair negotiations and 
jointly decide on the appropriate plan repair schemes. 
We will sketch the scenario. We will use the 
term agent to denote airlines, airports, aircraft, 
ground handlers, and all other parties involved in 
tactical plan repair. Initially, a global, feasible 
planning exists. Due to disruptions, this planning may 
become infeasible. An important principle is that the 
agent responsible for the conflict is responsible for its 
solution. Note that more than one, even all agents 
may be responsible, but for now we will assume a 
single responsible agent each time. The responsible 
agent initiates a search for repair schemes. This is 
done by examining several options to solve the 
conflict, communicating with the agents involved, 
asking for options and asking for their utilities of the 
actions required. In fact, it is asking for the prices the 
agents want for their part in the repair. This results in 
a number of repair schemes, and the corresponding 
prices that the responsible agent needs to pay to 
enforce that repair scheme. From these, the agent 
chooses the scheme with the lowest cost. This scheme 
is enforced and the corresponding prices are paid. 
Note that the process described is a reverse auction, 
i.e., an auction with one buyer and more than one 
possible sellers, where the responsible agent is the 
buyer. 
This mechanism has the following features. It is 
a distributed mechanism, which means that the 
generation and selection of repair schemes is done by 
the agents that are involved in or affected by a 
conflict. In this way multiple conflicts can be 
resolved simultaneously, without the need for a 
central problem solver. Secondly, the mechanism 
achieves efficient plan repair, i.e., it minimizes the 
total effort made by the agents. This is a result of the 
use of auctions – the repair scheme that requires the 
least effort of its agents will be least costly and thus 
be chosen.  
Thirdly, if we assume that agents ask fair prices 
and that agents do not have unlimited wealth, the 
mechanism achieves equitable plan repair. Equitable 
means that each agent should approximately give as 
much help to others as it receives. This principle 
follows from the use of money. An agent that 
provides help to other agents earns money, which it 
can spend to receive help when it needs it. An agent 
can never only receive help without giving help, as it 
would run out of money at some point. 
Thus, the distributed tactical plan repair 
paradigm provides a basis for efficient and equitable 
tactical plan repair, where participants have a clear 
incentive to collaborate and the workload is spread 
out over all participants. We made one strong 
assumption however, and that is that the agents ask 
fair prices, i.e., prices that correspond to the utility of 
an action. In the next section we will see what 
happens if this assumption is dropped.
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4 Experiments with market 
mechanisms 
4.1 Scenario 
At Amsterdam Airport Schiphol 94 gates and 
129 other stands are available to allocate aircraft. 
Schiphol is a hub airport for Air France/KLM. We 
simulate one week of traffic, in which during normal 
operation many gate conflicts occur because of late 
arrival of aircraft from outstations. The length of this 
period is determined by the need to simulate over a 
longer period of time in order to be able to measure 
performance in terms of equity. If on a single day one 
airline needs a lot of help from another airline, it 
would be equitable if the other airline is compensated 
for this in the days following. Usually, one gate 
conflict has an impact on several other aircraft, which 
causes the conflict to spread out to up to four (or 
more) gate re-allocations. In order to keep things 
controllable in our simulations, we consider situations 
where four aircraft are involved. One aircraft arrives 
late and causes a gate conflict with the following 
aircraft. Then, a number of options for solving the 
gate conflict are considered, the first being that the 
following aircraft just waits until the delayed one has 
departed again. The other options for solving the 
conflict involve an empty gate being assigned to the 
late arrival, but in our scenario this will cause a 
conflict with the aircraft that was originally planned 
there. 
Although simplified above, e.g. buffer positions 
to disembark passengers are not yet considered,  the 
gate assignment and gate re-allocation process can be 
modelled in these two types of repair schemes, as the 
scenario always ends with an aircraft being delayed 
which now can be the final solution or be the cause of 
yet another conflict. During a normal arrival peak 
period at Schiphol, several gate conflicts appear, so 
that we can assume in our simplified format 100 gate 
conflicts to be representative for one week of 
operations at the airport. 
4.2 Exploitation. 
In a market with many sellers and many buyers 
of a given good, if production costs are equal and 
competition perfect, the selling price will be just 
above the production cost. In that case, the ask price 
is an indication of the utility of the seller of 
producing the good. This is a necessary condition for 
the market mechanism to be equitable. 
However, in the tactical repair market, different 
sellers sell different goods and as a result, prices need 
not correspond with utility. Consider the following 
scenario. Aircraft X is delayed and has a conflict on 
its gate with aircraft Y, which is scheduled behind it. 
It considers two repair schemes: 1. aircraft Y waits 
until X is done and 2. X goes to gate B to disembark 
its passengers. Aircraft Z, which is scheduled on B, 
has to wait until X is done. In this example, Y and Z 
are sellers, selling the service of delaying their flight. 
Suppose that the utilities of Y and Z in both schemes 
is equal. Y could then still get away with asking a 
higher price for its service than Z. This is because Y 
realizes that for repair scheme 2, X has to change 
gates, which it doesn’t like and will want to avoid 
even against a certain cost. Y can now raise its price 
without losing the auction. By doing this, it makes a 
nice profit, since its production costs are much lower 
than its selling price. We call this phenomenon 
exploitation: raising ones prices until just below the 
point where one would lose the auction. Exploitation 
is possible if a seller is in a key-position, which is the 
case when its services are needed as part of a repair 
scheme, it can provide the services relatively easy 
and other repair schemes involve much more or more 
laborious services. 
Exploitation disturbs equitability. When prices 
no longer correspond with utility, we lose the 
guarantee that agents provide as much help as they 
receive. For instance, if a certain agent is in a key-
position often, and exploits this fully, it earns much 
more money than it should. It can spend this money 
to receive help, which would be more than the help it 
provided. Thus, the resulting plan repair schemes 
would be inequitable.  
To measure the effect of exploitation, we have 
set up a benchmark experiment in which aircraft 
repeatedly find themselves in planning conflicts, and 
need help from others to solve them. One experiment 
consists of 1500 rounds, with 15 airline-representing 
agents. To keep things simple, we assume that for 
each conflict there is one agent responsible, the 
problem owner. Each agent is problem owner 100 
times. For each problem there are 15 repair schemes 
generated, such that there is a default scheme of 
doing nothing, with a very low utility for the problem 
owner, and a number of schemes which involve one, 
 
Figure 1. Results of the experiments with coalition 
agents and exploiters. On the left  the experiments 
of the benchmark scenario. On the right the 
experiments with collective retaliation. Every 
column denotes one experiment. 
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two or three other agents with randomized utilities. 
The schemes that involve other agents have, by 
average, a lower total cost than the default scheme. In 
every round, the problem owner opens an auction, 
receives the other agents’ price submissions, selects 
the least costly repair scheme and makes the 
corresponding payments. After all the rounds the 
scores are calculated for the agents. The score of an 
agent is the average balance of effort per round, i.e. 
received effort minus given effort, plus its monetary 
balance. Effort is defined as the negation of utility. 
Thus, if a certain action requires a very high effort of 
an agent, is has a very low utility to that agent. 
Monetary balance is added to the score since earned 
money may still be spent to receive services and thus 
represents utility. 
There are two types of agents: coalition agents 
and exploiters. Coalition agents are agents that are 
truthful when submitting prices. We named them 
‘coalition agents’ because throughout this paper they 
will try to defeat the ‘wrongdoers’, of which there are 
two types: exploiters and, as we will later see, 
forsakers.  
Exploiters exhibit the described exploitation 
behaviour. If there are more than one exploiters 
involved in the cheapest candidate, they will work in 
perfect unison; they will each raise their price, but 
still make sure that the total price doesn't become too 
high. Their ‘profit’ is split randomly over the 
exploiters.  
We conducted the experiment six times, with 
an increasing proportion of the agent population 
being exploiters. The results can be seen in the left 
chart in figure 1. In the first column, with only 
coalition agent, the variance is close to zero, 
indicating equitable plan repair. When exploiters start 
to join in, they score much better than coalition 
agents, which is to be expected. If one assumes that 
agents will change their strategy to a dominant 
strategy, the ratio of exploiters can be expected to 
increase and we move up to the right in the graph, 
ending up in the column on the very right. In this 
scenario the variance is high, indicating an 
inequitable, undesirable situation. 
The reason that the variance is high in the last 
scenario is that we have explicitly modelled the fact 
that some agents have more exploitation 
opportunities than others, which we believe is 
plausible for real life situations. For instance, an 
airline that has many flights on gates next to each 
other can easily make changes and thereby 
accommodate for someone else. It needs to spend less 
effort to help than others, so it should be a lot 
cheaper, but it can easily exploit this situation. 
Because some agents exploit better than others, if all 
agents would exploit to their fullest, some agents will 
gain much more from this than others. The result is 
the inequitable situation we observed in the last 
experiment. 
4.3 Collective retaliation 
A straightforward remedy against exploitation, 
is what we will call collective retaliation: agents ask 
higher prices to the exploiters to nullify the profit 
they made from exploitation. Agents that are being 
exploited by an agent should estimate the measure of 
exploitation and pass this information on to all other 
agents. Every agent then calculates for every other 
agent a trust rate, where a low trust rate means that an 
agent asks too high prices. The trust ta,b that agent a 
has in agent b is 
 
 
where Eb is the sum of the estimations of the 
realistic prices agent b should have asked and Pb is 
the sum of the prices agent b did ask. When problem 
owner w now asks for price submissions for 
candidate r, an agent a calculates the price pr,a for its 
part in r by  
 
 
where ur,a is the utility of a for its part in r, ta,w 
is the trust agent a has in the problem owner w, and S 
is a punishment factor to make sure that exploiters are 
not only compensated but also punished a bit, to 
discourage them from exploiting. S should be greater 
than zero for exploiters (i.e. when ta,w < 1) and zero 
for non-exploiters. 
We have implemented this strategy in a second 
experiment, of which the results are shown in the 
right chart in figure 1. It shows that the strategy is 
successful; coalition agents score better than 
exploiters. We say that the coalition strategy 
dominates the exploitation strategy. This is our aim, 
as the dominating strategy will be adopted by all 
agents, and if all agents adopt the coalition strategy, 
the resulting plan repair is equitable. 
The success of the collective retaliation relies 
on two factors. First, the exploited agents should 
correctly estimate and truthfully communicate the 
amount of exploitation. We will make this 
assumption in this paper - an airline should be able to 
make a reasonable estimation of someone else’s 
costs, especially when agents are allowed to give 
supporting arguments for their prices and discussion 
is possible. Also, there is no strong direct advantage 
for an agent to exaggerate another agent's 
exploitation. Only if an agent consequently lies about 
all other agents could it cause a relative advantage for 
itself, but this can hardly go unnoticed and will harm 
this agent’s reputation. The second requirement for 
collective retaliation to be successful is that all agents 
correctly enforce the pricing rule. This is something 
we may not assume, since agents have reasons not to, 
as we will see in the next section. 
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4.4 Forsaking 
The method of collective retaliation works well 
if all agents enforce the pricing rule. But, a single 
agent who should at a certain moment raise its price 
as part of collective retaliation, may have an incentive 
to raise it less than it should. If there are more 
suppliers of a desired good or service, an agent might 
want to lower its price to win the deal. This is 
especially attractive if others raise their price as a 
result of collective retaliation; he may raise its price 
slightly less, win the deal, and make an attractive 
profit. We will call this kind of behaviour forsaking: 
deliberately asking a price between the realistic price 
and the one that should be asked as a result of 
collective retaliation, with the aim of winning the 
auction and making a profit.  
If there are more than one forsakers, they will 
compete against each other. They will each try to win 
the deal by setting their price lower than that of the 
other. This will drive the price down until, possibly, 
all but one forsaker are at their realistic price. If there 
are enough forsakers, the effects of the collective 
retaliation rule may in this way be fully nullified, 
which is undesirable.  
In order to test the effects of forsaking, we 
introduce a new type of agent in our experiment, the 
forsaker, and let it compete against coalition and 
exploiting agents. The coalition agents and exploiters 
use the collective retaliation pricing rule, the 
forsakers sell just below that price if the chance 
occurs. We have explicitly generated conflicts that 
are prey to exploiters, as well as conflicts that are 
prey to forsakers. In the first type of conflict there is 
one candidate with at least one exploiter involved that 
is cheaper than all other candidates. In the second 
type there are several cheap candidates, but in at least 
one of those there is a forsaker involved. We tested 
the strategy in 6 × 6 different distributions of 
exploiters, forsakers and coalition agents. The results 
can be seen in figure 2. The chart shows that 
forsaking is a dominant strategy in every situation. 
Thus, the ratio of forsakers can be expected to 
increase. The last six experiments show that, when 
everyone forsakes, it is also often dominant to 
exploit. Thus, the ratio of exploiters can be expected 
to go up, in which case we will end up in the very last 
column, which shows an unfair, hence undesired 
situation. 
A possible remedy against forsakers could be 
that the coalition retaliates them too. But this is far-
fetched. Forsaking is harder to detect than 
exploitation, since the drop in price can be quite 
small. A forsaker could claim that it is not forsaking, 
but that it is asking a realistic price, which happens to 
be lower than expected. If the coalition fails to 
recognize a forsaker, the consequences can be much 
greater than if it fails to recognize an exploiter. 
Suppose that the coalition doesn’t recognize 
exploiters and forsakers that stay within 5% of their 
realistic price. Then, an exploiter that alters its price 
by 5% will only gain 5%, while the forsaker might 
gain a lot more, namely the difference between the 
retaliation price and its realistic price minus 5%.  
Also, neither the forsaker nor the exploiter who is 
being retaliated has any incentive to complain about 
the forsaking – the exploiter likes forsakers. So, 
coalition agents should then check each bid that is 
submitted in auctions even in which they have no 
part. This is a lot of work and it requires that agents 
reveal pricing information to more agents than only 
 
 Figure 2. Results of the experiments with collective retaliation and forsaking. In subsequent series of 
experiments, the number of forsakers is increased, until there are only forsakers in the last six columns. 
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the problem owner, which is less desirable since 
agents like their information to remain as private as 
possible. We therefore do not find this remedy 
feasible. 
The reason that forsaking occurs is the fact that 
the credits that are unfairly earned can be spent again 
without any problems. We will solve this problem by 
introducing a monetary system in which this ‘dirty 
money’ cannot be spent that easily any more.  
5 Spender-signed money 
We propose the usage of a new monetary 
system to solve the exploiter problem. The monetary 
system is one of a group of systems called Local 
Exchange Trading Systems (LETS). These monetary 
systems have in common that the currency used is not 
an existing currency such as the euro or dollar, but a 
private currency that is accepted within the group of 
participants of a particular LETS. Our monetary 
system is based on a LETS called the WAT system 
[19]. In the WAT system, participants may issue 
credits when needed. A credit represents a promise of 
goods or services by the issuer. Credits may be 
passed on to other participants, which is called 
circulation. When a credit returns to its issuer, it 
disappears, which is called redemption. In the WAT 
system, it is required that every spender of a credit 
adds its name to that credit. Thus, every credit 
contains a list of signatures that show the history of 
that credit. The last person on the list vouches for the 
credibility of the credit. If this person would refuse to 
accept the credit, the second to last person is viable, 
and so on. The trust one has in a particular credit thus 
depends on the names written on it. If one sees 
trustable names, the credit’s value is guaranteed. If 
one sees untrusted or unknown names, one may not 
want to accept that credit. 
In the WAT-system, each credit has value 1. 
Our system differs in that credits may have any 
positive fractional value. We define the value of a 
credit as the product of the trust values of its users. 
Formally, if agent a receives a credit c with a list of 
users {b1, b2, ..., bj}, it assesses its value as 
 
 
where ta,b is the trust agent a has in agent b. So, 
every credit c has a value va(c) for every agent a. 
The auctioning protocol remains the same. 
Agents submit their prices to the problem owner, who 
selects the least costly repair scheme. However, 
determining which repair scheme is cheapest is not 
trivial, as credits may have different values to 
different agents. For instance, if the problem owner 
has credits that are valued much higher by agent a 
than by agent b, and these agents offer the same 
service for the same price, it would buy the service 
from agent a since he needs to spend fewer credits 
then. Details on how the cheapest repair scheme is 
determined can be found in appendix A.  
The main innovation of this monetary 
mechanism is the fact that a credit’s value is 
determined by the reputations of the agents who have 
used it. So, if a credit goes through the hands of an 
exploiter, it loses value. As any other agent can see, 
the name of the exploiter is on the credit and 
therefore it is valued lower. As a result of this, the 
exploiter has trouble spending its money, since every 
credit he likes to spend turns out to be worth less than 
when he received it. More importantly, forsaking is 
no longer an attractive strategy. Forsakers used to 
make a profit by deviating from the collective 
retaliation rule. But now there is no such rule 
anymore. To forsake, they should raise their trust 
 
Figure 3. Results of the experiment with spender-signed money. 
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value of an exploiter. If they do this, they will win the 
deal but obtain credits that have lost worth. When 
spending these on non-forsakers, they will incur a 
loss.  
We implemented the proposed monetary 
system and ran a set of experiments to test its 
performance. The results are depicted in figure 3. It 
shows that the coalition strategy dominates 
exploitation and forsaking in every experiment where 
coalition agents participate. If all agents adopt this 
strategy, we get the situation in the first column, with 
the smallest variance and therefore the most fair 
allocation. 
Note that spender-signed money is a private 
currency, in use only by the parties participating in 
plan repair. Also, there is no link between real money 
and spender-signed money. This is important for the 
equity criterion. If there would be a link between real 
money and the private money system, richer airlines 
for instance would be able to obtain better plan repair 
quality than poorer airlines. This is in conflict with 
the equity principle, which states that all airlines have 
equal rights on quality of plan repair. 
6 Requirements for 
implementation 
The negotiations described in this paper, in 
particular the auctioning, can be performed by 
software agents. These are intelligent computer 
programs that negotiate on behalf of their owner. A 
currently fast developing field of research is 
multivalent systems, in which interactions between 
software agents is studied [20]. 
In such negotiations, agents promote the 
interest of their owner. In the case of tactical plan 
repair, it needs to know the costs it has to ask for 
several possible repair actions. We assume that such 
an agent is connected to the computer system of its 
owner, and thus has access to its information. An 
owner may program an agent to determine costs in 
the way the owner likes. For instance, an airline 
might want an agent to weigh the total delay times 
the number of passengers heavily in the cost function. 
An airport might program its agent to assign more 
weight to environmental consequences. 
The emergence of multiagent systems 
technology enables systems such as described in this 
paper. Software agents are able to communicate, 
process information and make calculations much 
faster than humans. A group of agents could share, 
evaluate and choose repair schemes and make the 
necessary payments in a matter of seconds. This 
allows a higher level of information exchange and 
repair, leading to more satisfying repairs.  
A requirement for the use of spender-signed 
money is a secure digital cash system. The i-WAT 
system is an implementation of a spender-signed 
monetary system similar to ours. It uses the PGP trust 
model to prevent against fraud [17]. It can therefore 
act as a starting point for the implementation of the 
spender-signed money described in this paper.  
7 Conclusion and discussion 
With the introduction of advanced planning 
concepts in the CDM framework, the possibility to 
“cheat the system” will start being exploited. 
Currently, simple operational procedures are 
implemented, like “do not send a new expected time 
more than three times”, to prevent parties from taking 
an undesired advantage of a profitable situation. 
In the context of Total Airport Management, 
airlines will start to have a say in traffic operations 
and gate assignment. Inter-airline communications 
are currently not examined, because of the 
commercially sensitive information they need to 
share and hence the possibility to misuse the system.  
In this paper, we present a collaboration 
framework that does not allow exploitation of 
strategically advantageous positions. All airlines can 
participate and are rewarded for a positive attitude. 
Airlines that manipulate the plan repair process to 
obtain an unfair advantage over others are 
automatically punished as a result of the spender-
signed monetary system.  
As an example, we implemented a scenario for 
gate assignment, but because of the distributed nature 
of the agents, the system is fully scaleable and can be 
extended towards ATC, the airport, handlers, and 
passengers. Handlers (or dispatchers in the U.S.) will 
be able to optimise their processes and negotiate on 
their resources. They could share information on their 
activities and buy in services from others.  
Different application areas can be examined. In 
fact, in any application where collaboration is 
required between parties that serve their own interest 
the system can be applied to achieve efficient and 
equitable cooperation. If, for instance, Free Flight 
would in the future be extended to include 
communication of intent or preference information, 
exploitation should surely be prevented. As another 
application example, the business trajectory as now 
proposed in SESAR lends itself very well for the 
described approach.  
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